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I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Constitution founded the United States on a princi-
ple that the federal government has limited, enumerated powers. Discounted
for much of the twentieth century, the resurgence of this principle raises
new questions about the source of constitutional authority for many federal
laws. Some of this scrutiny is focused on the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) of 1978, a federal law designed to counter the widespread practice
of states removing Native American children from their families. Now more
than ever, it is worthwhile to reexamine the text and history of the Constitu-
tion to more fully understand the authority of the federal government to
enact beneficial laws in Indian affairs. The inquiry also sheds light on the
sovereignty of tribal nations in the context of child custody decisions.
This Article advances the Offences Clause as an additional, and impor-
tant, source of federal authority in Indian affairs, particularly for the Indian
Child Welfare Act. The Constitution grants Congress the power to define
* Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Fall 2016, Cornell Law School; Adjunct Professor,
Northwestern School of Law at Lewis & Clark. I am grateful to Stephanie Parent, Sam Hirsch, and
Samantha Dossett for their thoughtful comments and to Cornell Law School for supporting this research.
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and punish “Offences against the Law of Nations.”1 This clause provides
enumerated authority for Congress to regulate both civil and criminal mat-
ters that arise between sovereigns, such as the citizenship and custody of
children.2 Just as Congress has authority to enact the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act,3 it also holds power to address the custody of
children of tribal citizens. The Offences Clause provides a response to
claims that the Indian Child Welfare Act exceeds congressional authority,
such as those brought by the State of Texas in current litigation.4 Contrary
to those claims, ICWA is an exercise of the well-established authority of
Congress to pass laws under its enumerated powers and involves little more
than an application of the Supremacy Clause’s provision that federal law
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”5 enforceable in every state.6
Although the Offences Clause does not specifically reference indige-
nous tribal nations, there is considerable evidence that it was intended to
authorize Congress to regulate relationships with tribal nations as well as
foreign governments. Much like the Treaty Clause and the Territory Clause,
the Framers wrote the Offences Clause with a broad scope to include both
foreign powers and tribal nations within its reach.7 Just as Scotland and
Wales are within Great Britain, the Framers considered tribal nations to be
distinct national jurisdictions within the boundaries of the United States.8
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. This article retains the original spelling of the term “offences”
because it is in the text of the Constitution, it is an acceptable variant in modern U.S. dictionaries, and it
is the preferred spelling in most of the English-speaking world. The original spelling also emphasizes its
use as a constitutional term of art, and not its ordinary sense of a “criminal offense.”
2. See generally Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Of-
fenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX L. REV. 843 (2007). Professor Kent’s textual analysis and
dive into Founding-era history provides a primer on the relevance of the Offences Clause to current
foreign affairs debates.
3. 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2018).
4. Notice of Appeal, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, https://perma.cc/CN7CPPQW (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
2018) (No. 4:17-CV-0868-O).
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79 (1992) (“Federal statutes enforceable in
state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state
judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.”).
7. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 2 (reviewing the history and scope of the Offences Clause). Vigor- R
ous academic analysis of the Offences Clause is a recent development in legal scholarship. For further
background, see Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and
Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449, 452 (2000);
Michael T. Morley, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Constitution: A Defense of
Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109, 111, 129, 138 (2002); Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and
Defining in the Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause 48 (Nw. Pritzer Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
220, 2012); ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION xix–xvii (2017).
8. The initial U.S. boundaries were established by the 1783 Treaty of Paris “to the river Missis-
sippi,” although most of that territory was occupied by independent tribal nations. See Treaty of Peace,
Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. Arthur St. Clair, the first Governor of the Northwest Territory, in 1788 de-
scribed the reaction of tribal leaders to the U.S. territorial claim. “Our pretensions to the country they
2
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It is important to consider additional sources of constitutional authority
for federal laws because the growing trend in both the Supreme Court and
Congress is to consider the overriding objective of the Constitution as limit-
ing the powers of the federal government. Every law Congress passes must
fall within one of the enumerated authorities, or be “necessary and proper”
for the implementation of such a power.9 The Tenth Amendment explicitly
limits Congress by providing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.”10
After the New Deal, it seemed as if the limits on federal power had
been discarded and nearly any federal law could be upheld as an exercise of
authority under the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.11 This began to change in the mid-1990s with
three Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Lopez,12 City of Boerne v.
Flores,13 and United States v. Morrison.14 Collectively, these cases signaled
the Court’s intent to more narrowly construe congressional powers. More
recently, the Court addressed the Commerce Clause in NFIB v. Sebelius,15
regarding the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act. Focusing on
Lopez’s requirement that Congress regulate only commercial activity rather
than inactivity, the Court held that the individual mandate could not be en-
acted under the Commerce Clause.16
As a result of these decisions, more advocates and scholars are ques-
tioning the source of authority for existing federal laws that do not spring
plainly from an enumerated power. This scrutiny is now focused on ICWA,
a federal law that applies to state court domestic-relations proceedings and
directs the outcomes of child custody decisions for the children of tribal
inhabit has been made known to them, in so unequivocal a manner, and the consequences are so certain
and so dreadful to them, that there is little probability of there ever being any cordiality between us . . .
our British neighbors at the same time they deny the cession of Country made by them, suffer them not
to forget for a moment the claim that is founded upon it.” 2 Territorial Papers of the United States 119,
U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1934).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal Commerce
Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 29–38 (2012); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection:
Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 844–49
(2015); see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (setting the precedent for an expansive reading of
the Commerce Clause, and dramatically increasing the regulatory authority of the federal government).
12. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
15. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
16. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 558.
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nation citizens.17 Brackeen v. Zinke18 is the latest and most successful con-
stitutional challenge, but the effort has been building for several years, par-
ticularly since the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl.19
ICWA was enacted in 1978 in response to the widespread practice of
state child welfare departments removing custody of Indian children from
their families, tribes, and cultures.20 The House Resources Committee
stated in its report on ICWA that “[t]he wholesale separation of Indian chil-
dren from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of
American Indian life today.”21 Congress sought to stop this practice,22 and
ICWA continues to serve this purpose today.
Those who challenge ICWA often do so by arguing that family law is
not an enumerated federal power and is generally understood to be a matter
of state law. State legislatures define what constitutes a family and enact
laws that regulate marriage, divorce, parentage, child custody, adoption,
child welfare, and family support obligations. State courts generally decide
family law cases.23
However, family law is also a long-established matter of tribal govern-
ment law and federal preemption. The Supreme Court long ago laid down
the rule that tribal domestic relations are not subject to state law.24 The
extensiveness of tribal authority over matters of domestic relations was set
forth by Justice Van Devanter in United States v. Quiver:25
At an early period it became the settled policy of Congress to permit the
personal and domestic relations of the Indians with each other to be regu-
lated, and offenses by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian to be dealt with, according to their tribal customs and laws.26
ICWA reinforces this rule, stating that tribal governments have exclusive
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving an Indian child domi-
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
18. No. 4:17-CV-86800868-O, 2018 WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018).
19. 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
20. DOI BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT 5 (2016).
21. ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR THE PLACEMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE
HOMES, TO PREVENT THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN FAMILIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. NO. 95-
13896, at 9 (1978).
22. H.R. REP. NO 95-13896, at 19 (1978).
23. See generally Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“The durational residency requirement
under attack in this case is a part of Iowa’s comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by this
Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact.”).
24. See, e.g., Carney v. Chapman, 247 U.S. 102 (1918); United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221
(10th Cir. 2005).
25. 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
26. Id. at 603–04.
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ciled within the reservation of such tribe.27 However, ICWA goes further
and applies to state courts when tribal citizens and their children reside
outside of reservation boundaries.28 The argument that ICWA exceeds Con-
gress’s authority generally arises in this off-reservation context.
In the enactment of ICWA, Congress cited the Indian Commerce
Clause as its source of authority and asserted that “through this and other
constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs . . .
[and] through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with In-
dian tribes, [Congress] has assumed the responsibility for the protection and
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources.”29 Professors Matthew
Fletcher and Wenona T. Singel have presented a strong argument that
ICWA is constitutional as a matter of the original understanding of the In-
dian Commerce Clause.30
Yet many continue to challenge the constitutionality of ICWA. Justice
Thomas fueled these efforts with his 2013 concurrence in Adoptive Couple
v. Baby Girl:31
The ICWA asserts that the Indian Commerce Clause, and “other constitu-
tional authority” provides Congress with “plenary power over Indian af-
fairs.” The reference to “other constitutional authority” is not illuminating,
and I am aware of no other enumerated power that could even arguably
support Congress’ intrusion into this area of traditional state authority.32
Justice Thomas argues that “neither the text nor the original understanding
of the Clause supports Congress’ claim to such ‘plenary’ power.”33
In the Brackeen litigation, the State of Texas cited Justice Thomas’s
argument that  ICWA is unconstitutional, contending that the law intrudes
into state domestic relations and “children are not articles of commerce, nor
can their placement be said to substantially affect commerce with Indian
nations.”34 The district court decision, which is on appeal,35 avoided the
direct challenge to the source of constitutional authority, instead concluding
that ICWA’s use of ancestry to determine the eligibility of children for tri-
bal citizenship is an unlawful racial classification and that ICWA comman-
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2018).
28. Id. § 1911(b).
29. Id. § 1901.
30. MATTHEW L. M. FLETCHER & WENONA T. SINGEL, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30:
FACING THE FUTURE 39–41 (2008); see also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, On Indian Children and the Fifth
Amendment, 80 MONT. L. REV. 202, 612–17 (2019).
31. 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 657–59.
33. Id. at 659.
34. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 59, Brackeen v. Zinke, https://perma.cc/K92Z-AS58 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22,
2018) (No. 4:17-CV-00868-O).
35. Notice of Appeal, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, https://perma.cc/CN7C-PPQW (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
2018) (No. 4:17-CV-0868-O).
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deers the state legislative process in violation of Commerce Clause princi-
ples.36 Nevertheless, the constitutional-authority question underlies every
argument raised by the state and will be considered by the Fifth Circuit.
This Article puts forth the Offences Clause as a response to the chal-
lenges raised by Justice Thomas and the State of Texas,37 including con-
cerns about racial classification or overreach of commerce clause authority.
Contrary to these claims, ICWA is in a well-established category of federal
laws addressing citizenship, nationality, and immigration. Section two ad-
dresses the problems with relying on the plenary power doctrine as a source
of authority for congressional action in Indian affairs. Section three de-
scribes how indigenous governments in the United States were understood
to be “nations” in early U.S. history and within the scope of the Offences
Clause. Section four traces the Framers’ understanding of the law of na-
tions, and its grounding in the work of Emer de Vattel, the eighteenth-cen-
tury jurist whose work heavily influenced the drafting of the Constitution.
The fourth section demonstrates how the Offences Clause was intended for
civil remedies as well as criminal punishment. Section five describes the
close fit between Vattel’s natural law principle that the citizenship of chil-
dren follows the parents, and the purpose of ICWA in regulating the citizen-
ship and custody of children born to tribal citizens. The final section com-
pares federal authority over child custody and citizenship in the foreign
affairs context.
II. THE CONCERN WITH PLENARY POWER
Federal authority in Indian affairs is readily traced to two sources in
the Constitution. Article I’s Commerce Clause empowers Congress “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”38 Article II, section 2 of the Constitution gives the
President the power “to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.”39 In 1871, Congress signaled it would no longer ratify In-
36. Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 4:17-CV-0868-O, 2018 WL 4927908, at *1, 7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
2018).
37. This Article is an offshoot of my exploration of the Territory Clause as an additional source of
power for federal laws in “Indian country.” John H. Dossett, Indian Country and the Territory Clause:
Washington’s Promise at the Framing, 68 A.M. U. L. REV. 205, 207–10 (2018). The text of the Terri-
tory Clause is also broad, authorizing Congress to make needful rules and regulations “respecting” the
territory or other property belonging to the United States. The federal government has adopted a trust
responsibility to protect tribal lands as homelands for tribal cultures and tribal self-government. For this
reason, the Territory Clause can also be considered as authority for a range of matters affecting Indian
tribes, including the Indian Child Welfare Act.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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dian treaties, ending the nearly 100-year-old practice, and would instead
unilaterally regulate Indian affairs by statute.40
Following the end of the treaty-making period, the Supreme Court de-
veloped a new federal authority in Indian affairs: a “plenary” power not
found in the text of the Constitution but drawn from the intrinsic authority
of the United States.41 Beginning in 1886 with United States v. Kagama42
and running to United States v. Lara43 in 2004, a string of Supreme Court
decisions developed a congressional authority over Indian affairs based in
“preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Govern-
ment.”44
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court devel-
oped the plenary power doctrine to justify federal laws that confiscated tri-
bal lands and intruded on tribal self-government.45 But attitudes towards
tribal rights have shifted remarkably, and since the late twentieth century
Congress has frequently enacted laws supporting tribal self-government,
such as ICWA. Today, federal laws governing tribal nations and their citi-
zens cover subjects as varied as tribal government organization, tribal
courts, civil rights, law enforcement, health care, education, housing, and
cultural resources.46 In the twenty-first century, these laws are commonly
subjected to a question: if the federal government has limited powers under
the Constitution, and the commerce authority is construed narrowly, where
did Congress derive the authority to enact this broad range of federal laws
related to Indian tribes and native peoples? Although the Supreme Court
historically deferred to Congress on this question, more recently, some
members of both the Court and Congress are inclined to limit federal power
to its enumerated sources and question whether Congress has any power in
Indian affairs other than regulating commerce.
Specifically, Justice Thomas is unreceptive to the notion of an
unenumerated plenary power. He first expressed his views in 2004, with a
concurrence in United States v. Lara, a decision on the scope of tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction.47 Justice Thomas has raised questions with plenary power
in four subsequent decisions: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Puerto Rico v.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2018).
41. NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET. AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01 (Nell
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012).
42. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
43. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
44. Id. at 200–01.
45. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–68 (1903).
46. See generally Title 25 of the United States Code and Chapter 53 of Title 18 of the United States
Code.
47. Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Sanchez Valle,48 United States v. Bryant,49 and most recently Town of
Vernon v. United States.50 Legal scholars have long questioned whether
Congress has plenary authority to take tribal lands and restrict tribal
rights.51 Justice Thomas has reversed the question. Does Congress have au-
thority for federal laws that recognize and support tribal rights?52
Some members of Congress have picked up Justice Thomas’s argu-
ment, and are also questioning plenary power, creating a new obstacle to
legislation that would address problems in Indian country and strengthen
tribal self-government. For example, in 2013 Congress acted to recognize
tribal authority to prosecute domestic violence crimes committed by non-
Indians53 to cure problems created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.54 This legislation faced opposition from
some members of Congress who questioned the source of congressional
authority to recognize and restore tribal criminal jurisdiction.55
In this context, it is important to reexamine the sources of federal au-
thority in Indian affairs. Plenary power in Indian affairs is both too strong
and too weak. It is too strong because it purports to authorize the federal
government to do virtually anything to Indian tribes and native people: take
tribal lands, assimilate tribal children, forbid tribal religions and languages,
terminate tribal existence—all this is fair game under a boundless and nebu-
lous plenary power doctrine.56
48. 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2016).
49. 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1967–68 (2016).
50. Order Denying Cert., Town of Vernon v. United States, 2017 WL 566097 (Nov. 27, 2017) (Nos.
16-1320, 17-8) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limita-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984) (“The judiciary’s frequent invocation of federal plenary power
over Indian affairs is curious since the Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government a
general power to regulate Indian affairs.”); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996) (Plenary power’s “inconsistency with the most fundamental of constitu-
tional principles—the McCulloch understanding that Congress ordinarily possesses only that authority
delegated to it in the Constitution—is an embarrassment of constitutional theory.”).
52. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1967–68; Sanchez Valley, 136 S. Ct. at 1877; Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at
565–66.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013). This section is an amendment to the Indian Civil Right Act.
54. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
55. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Luppino-Esposito, The Violence Against Women Act, Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 5–7 (2012). The questions
arose from members of Congress who follow the writings of the Heritage Foundation. For generations,
Congress has been content to rely on an atextual plenary power when restricting the rights of Indian
tribes. Now, in an era where it is possible to contemplate restoring tribal authority, Congress’s power is
sharply questioned. However, this is not unique to Indian affairs. There is generally an increased focus
on strict adherence to enumerated constitutional authorities. During Republican majorities, the Rules of
the House of Representatives require that every bill include a Constitutional Authority Statement citing
the constitutional power granted to Congress. H.R. DOC. NO. 113-181, at 629 (2015).
56. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“. . . Congress has plenary power
to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.”);
8
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Plenary power is too weak because it is not enumerated in the text of
the Constitution. When tribal leaders ask Congress to address problems in
Indian country, the legislation is vulnerable to questions about the source of
federal authority. Even if Congress can be convinced, federal courts will
search for a source of enumerated authority among centuries of inconsistent
precedents. Plenary power’s lack of a clear textual source becomes a justifi-
cation for tribes to lose whenever the stakes are high. With these concerns
in mind, the National Congress of American Indians and the Native Ameri-
can Rights Fund have testified to Congress that “[t]here is perhaps no area
of domestic law that needs more revision than that of plenary power.”57
Plenary power remains entrenched in Supreme Court precedent, and
more recent statements from the Court describe it as drawn from multiple
provisions in the Constitution: the Indian Commerce Clause,58 the Treaty
Clause,59 the Territory Clause,60 the Indians Not Taxed Clauses,61 the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause,62 and the Supremacy Clause.63 Collectively, the
argument goes, these constitutional provisions establish in Congress the
power to broadly regulate Indian affairs.64 The purpose of this Article is to
place one more enumerated power under consideration: the Offences
Clause. This source of enumerated authority bears considerable weight on
its own for the regulation of important matters between tribal nations and
states, such as the citizenship and custody of children.
III. TRIBAL NATIONS CONSIDERED “NATIONS” BY THE FRAMERS AND
THROUGHOUT UNITED STATES HISTORY
The Offences Clause grants Congress the power to define and punish
“Offences against the Law of Nations.”65 There is little doubt that the Fram-
ers considered the indigenous peoples of the United States to be “nations”
within the scope of the “law of nations” because they repeatedly used these
terms in laws, treaties, and official correspondence relating to Indian af-
Frickey, supra note 51, at 35; Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian R
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 163 (2002).
57. Setting the Standard: Domestic Policy Implications of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: Hearing on S. 112–174 Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 93 (2011)
(joint prepared statement of the Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians and the Native Am. Rights Funds).
58.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
61. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
63. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citing the Commerce Clause, the Treaty
Clause, the Territory and Property Clause, and “preconstitutional” powers).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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fairs.66 During the time of drafting and ratification of the Constitution, the
United States was engaging with tribal nations on a sovereign basis, fight-
ing wars and negotiating treaties all along the western frontier from the
Northwest Indian Confederacy to the Cherokee and Creek wars in the
South.67 With their British and Spanish allies, tribal nations posed a serious
threat to the fledgling United States government.68 One of the primary pur-
poses of the Constitutional Convention and the Offences Clause was to
transfer authority over both Indian affairs and foreign affairs from the states
to the federal government.69
After the Revolutionary War ended in 1783, white settlers and land
speculators pushed farther into the frontier and triggered violent conflict
with the western tribal nations.70 Indians “killed or captured as many as
three thousand Anglo-Americans between 1783 and 1790—two-thirds as
many as had died fighting in the Revolution.”71 Left unrecorded is the num-
ber of Native Americans who were slaughtered. John Jay, later the first
Chief Justice, wrote to Thomas Jefferson in December 1786: “Indians have
been murdered by our People in cold Blood and no satisfaction given, nor
are they pleased with the avidity with which we seek to acquire their
Lands.”72 As George Washington wrote, “[T]he settlem[en]t of the Western
Country, and making a Peace with the Indians, are so analogous, that there
can be no definition of the one, without involving considerations of the
other.”73 Indian affairs were on the front foot during this critical period of
U.S. history.
The Articles of Confederation fed the chaos on the western frontier.
The seven “landed” states, relying on colonial charters that purported to
stretch all the way “from the Atlantick . . . to the South Sea,”74 laid claim to
the trans-Appalachian lands and were reluctant to cede them to the central
government.75 Article IX granted Congress “the sole and exclusive right
66. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 1 RECORDS]; see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L. J.
1012, 1061, 1066–67 (2015). Professor Ablavsky has written compellingly about Washington, Knox,
and others among the Founders who understood Indian tribes as sovereigns subject to the Law of Na-
tions. His analysis stops short of claiming the Offenses Clause as a source of federal authority in Indian
affairs.
67. See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 1783–1812,
4–39 (1967); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1009–38 (2014).
68. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 69, 78. R
69. 1 RECORDS, supra note 66, at 594. R
70. Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1009–38. R
71. Id. at 1039.
72. 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 599 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1954).
73. Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1014. R
74. Commw. v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451, 503 (1857).
75. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 68–71; COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE R
WASHINGTON 193–94, 278–79 (2018) (describing the various violent clashes between Indians and set-
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON107.txt unknown Seq: 11 15-MAY-19 9:26
2019 THE LAW OF NATIONS 51
and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right
of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated”76—language
that James Madison mocked as “obscure and contradictory,” if not “abso-
lutely incomprehensible.”77 Seizing on the Articles’ ambiguity, several
states proceeded to strong-arm Indians into ceding land and signing treaties,
sometimes directly clashing with federal treaty negotiators.78
As the Framers gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, “Con-
gress was deluged with bad news regarding Indian affairs.”79 War Secretary
Henry Knox concluded that the government was “utterly unable to maintain
an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of success.”80 The only hope for
peace on the frontier was a nationwide “policy of justice toward the Indians
and protection of their rights and property against unscrupulous traders, av-
aricious settlers, and ubiquitous speculators.”81
Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph opened the Constitutional Con-
vention with a speech describing a primary defect in the Articles of Confed-
eration as Congress “could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of
nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct pro-
voke war without controul.”82 John Jay applied these concerns explicitly to
Indian wars in the Federalist No. 3.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and
the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be appre-
hended under one general government than under several lesser ones . . . .
Not a single Indian war has yet been produced by aggressions of the present
federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian
hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual
States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have
given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.83
John Rutledge of South Carolina, who chaired the Committee of Detail dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention, wrote “Indian Affairs” next to “the Law
of Nations” in his copy of the draft constitution.84 How much can be made
of these margin notes? A great deal of weight is placed on Madison’s
tlers pushing westward); Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV.
27, 34 (1964).
76. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, § 4.
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, 268–69 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
78. Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1018–33. R
79. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 39. R
80. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774–1789 388–89 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
81. 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 46 (1984).
82. 1 RECORDS, supra note 66, at 19 (describing Madison’s notes of Randolph’s speech) (emphasis R
added).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, 44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
84. 1 RECORDS, supra note 66, at 143. R
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Records of the Federal Convention, although they were heavily revised and
not published until 60 years afterwards. 85 Even more weight is placed on
the Federalist Papers, although they were drafted after the Constitutional
Convention as advocacy for state ratification.86 Rutledge’s margin notes
have the advantage of being a simultaneous, eye-witness account of the
intent of the Framers as they drafted the text of the Constitution. In 1789,
President George Washington appointed Rutledge as one of the inaugural
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.87 Serving as
both Chairman of the Committee of Detail, and as one of the most trusted
legal minds of his era, significant weight can be placed on his notes as
evidence of the Framers’ intentions.
Further, it is reasonable to assume that the Framers intended the term
“Nation” in the Offences Clause to include tribal nations because they used
it in this sense in their contemporaneous expressions. In July of 1789, two
months after Washington’s inauguration, Secretary of War Knox wrote to
the President with his plan for Indian affairs: “The independent nations and
tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not as the sub-
jects of any particular state . . . .”88 Two months later, President Washing-
ton wrote to the Senate in reference to “the treaties with certain Indian na-
tions.”89 Washington counseled, that “all treaties and compacts formed by
the United States with other nations whether civilized or not, should be
made with caution, and executed with fidelity . . . .” He urged that foreign
treaties and Indian treaties should be ratified by the Senate in the same
manner, “so that our national proceedings in this respect may become uni-
form, and be directed by fixed and stable principles.”90
In fact, the very first treaty ratified by the Senate during the First Con-
gress was the Treaty of Fort Harmar with the “Wyandot, Delaware, Ottowa,
Chippewa, Pattewatima, and Sac Nations.”91 The Senate ratified this treaty
in September of 1789, while state ratification of the Constitution was still
pending in North Carolina and Rhode Island.92 The second was the Treaty
85. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
179–81, 187–89, 223–24, 327 (2017).
86. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 518 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486, 539–40 (1969).
87. 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH
BIOGRAPHIES OF ALL THE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES 138 (1902).
88. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 15 JUNE 1789–5 SEPTEMBER
1789 34–41 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1989).
89. 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES SEPTEMBER 1789–JANUARY
1790 51–53 (W.W. Abbot et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 4 WASHINGTON PAPERS].
90. Id. at 51–53.
91. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 18–23 (Charles J. Kappler, ed., 1904) [hereinafter 2
INDIAN AFFAIRS].
92. 4 WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 89, at 113–14. R
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of New York in 1790, which proclaimed “perpetual peace and friendship
between all the citizens of the United States of America, and all the individ-
uals, towns and tribes of the Upper, Middle and Lower Creeks and Semano-
lies composing the Creek Nation of Indians.”93 Both of these treaties re-
peatedly use the term “nation” to describe tribal governments and demon-
strate the intent of the First Congress and the Framers to treat with them as
with other nations. As discussed below in section five, the Framers relied
on Vattel’s Law of Nations for first principles of statecraft, and as Vattel
noted, “[p]ublic treaties can only be made by the superior powers, by sover-
eigns who contract in the name of the state.”94 In this way, the early treaties
are in and of themselves evidence of the Framer’s recognition of tribal na-
tionhood.
Thomas Jefferson was serving as the first Secretary of State in 1790
when he wrote a legal opinion to President Washington regarding the State
of Georgia’s sale of Indian land and subsequent disputes with the Chicka-
saw and Choctaw Nations.95 In it, he described the federal control over
Indian land policy as an aspect of the law of nations:
If the country, instead of being altogether vacant, is thinly occupied by an-
other nation, the right of the natives forms an exception to that of the new
comers; that is to say, these will only have a right against all other nations
except the natives: consequently they have the exclusive privilege of acquir-
ing the native right by purchase, or other just means. this is called the right
of pre-emption; & is become a principle of the law of nations, fundamental
with respect to America.96
Treaties with foreign nations also used the term. In 1795, the Senate
ratified the Pinckney Treaty with Spain, wherein “both Parties oblige them-
selves expressly to restrain by force all hostilities on the part of the Indian
nations living within their boundary.”97
A digital search of the text of all Indian treaties reveals the term “na-
tion” or “nations” used 517 times to describe the various tribal nations, the
last one with the “Navajo Nation” in 1868.98 Even the federal law that en-
ded treaty-making used the term:
93. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 25. R
94. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVER-
EIGNS §§ 154, 158, 192 (Joseph Chitty ed., 6th Am. ed. 1844) [hereinafter VATTEL 1844]. Vattel distin-
guishes public treaties from those between sovereigns respecting private affairs, and those between a
sovereign and a private person.
95. 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 16 January–June 1790 379–81
(Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 5 WASHINGTON PAPERS].
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 138–52
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
98. U.S. GOV’T PUBLISHING OFFICE, https://www.gpo.gov (click “Explore and Research,” then
click “govinfo,” then click “A to Z,” then scroll down to “Kappler’s Treaties;” then click “Volume 2”
then search “nation,” “nations,” and “Navajo Nation”) (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
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No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any
treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior
to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invali-
dated or impaired.99
Although no President has attempted to negotiate an Indian treaty since that
time, this action did not override the language of the Constitution or the
original intent of the Framers to include tribal nations within the scope of
the Offences Clause.
Congress has used the term “nation” to describe tribal nations through-
out U.S. history. In July of 1775, soon after the Battle of Bunker Hill, and
as George Washington assumed command of the Continental Army, the
Continental Congress wrote a missive to the “Six” Iroquois “Confederate
Nations” begging for peace.100 In 1786, the Continental Congress enacted a
comprehensive ordinance for regulating Indian affairs, stating that “the
safety and tranquility of the frontiers of the United States do in some mea-
sure depend on the maintaining a good correspondence between their citi-
zens and the several nations of Indians . . . .”101 In 1834, Congress enacted
the bedrock Trade and Intercourse Act whereby “no purchase, grant, lease,
or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity,
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution.”102 This is still the law today.103
These are but a few examples. There are hundreds of references to
“Indian Nations” in the correspondence among the Framers.104 There are
even more references to specific tribal nations. For example, a search of the
National Archives online repository reveals 549 references to the confeder-
acy of the “Six Nations,” and 72 to the “Five Nations,”105 173 references to
99. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2018).
100. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1779: MAY 10–SEPTEMBER 20, 1775
177–183 (Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905).
101. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789: JANUARY 2–JULY 31, 1786 369
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934).
102. An Act of June 30, 1834 to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to
Preserve Peace on the Frontiers, Pub. L. No. 23-161, § 10, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
103. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2018).
104. National Archives, Founders Online, FOUNDERSARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019). This website repository contains correspondence and other writings in an online
database of thousands of records from George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton,
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. A search for the term “Indian Nations” reveals 168
uses. The terms “Indian” and “nation” occur near each other 906 times (within ten words).
105. The Iroquois or Haudenosaunee Confederacy were known as the Five Nations, comprising the
Mohawk, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, and Seneca. After 1722, they accepted the Tuscarora into their
confederacy and became known as the Six Nations.
14
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“Cherokee Nation,” 233 to the “Creek Nation,” 27 to the “Chickasaw Na-
tion,” 28 to the “Choctaw Nation,” 18 to the “Delaware Nation,” 12 to the
“Oneida Nation,” and 6 mentions of the “Wyandot Nation.”106 There are
many more references with variations in syntax and spelling, but all reveal
consistent usage of the term “nation” to refer to the indigenous governments
that preceded the United States.
In the ensuing years of frontier violence, the Offences Clause served as
the basis for federal laws addressing diplomatic relations among Indian and
foreign governments,107 as well as border conflicts known as depreda-
tions.108 For example, in 1834, Congress enacted the Depredations Act to
require any tribe “in amity” with the United States to “make satisfaction,”
upon demand by the United States, for property offenses against non-Indi-
ans outside Indian country.109 The depredations laws addressed frontier vio-
lence by permitting each nation to punish offenses by their respective citi-
zens, even when committed on the other’s territory.110
After the Modoc Indian War of 1873, the Attorney General opined that
prisoners accused of killing military officers under a flag of truce were sub-
ject to the “law of nations” under the Offences Clause and could be tried by
a military commission.111 The Attorney General concluded that:
[A]s they have been recognized as independent communities for treaty-mak-
ing purposes, and as they frequently carry on organized and protracted wars,
they may properly, as it seems to me, be held subject to those rules of war-
fare which make a negotiation for peace after hostilities possible, and which
make perfidy like that in question punishable by military authority.112
106. See National Archives, Founders Online, FOUNDERSARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov
(search listed terms under “Over 182,000 Searchable Documents”) (searches performed Feb. 6, 2019).
107. An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and Providing for the Temporary Government
Thereof, Pub. L. 8-38, § 15, 2 Stat. 283, 289 (1804) (encouraging the President to exchange eastern
tribal lands for those west of the Mississippi, and providing that tribes “will not hold any treaty with any
foreign power, individual state, or with the individuals of any state or power”); An Act for the Preserva-
tion of Peace with the Indian Tribes, Pub. L. 6-5, 2 Stat. 6 (1800) (prohibiting any person to “carry on a
correspondence, by letter or otherwise, with any foreign nation or power to excite any Indian nation,
tribe or chief, to war against the United States . . . .”).
108. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1907 104 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1908) (Washington reported he had used the military against hostile Indian tribes to
“punish their depredations”).
109. See 25 U.S.C. § 229 (2018) (codifying R.S. § 2156) (from Acts June 30, 1834, Pub. L. No. 23-
161, § 17, 4 Stat. 731 (1834); An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to
Preserve Peace on the Frontiers, Pub. L. No. 23-161, 4 Stat. 729, 731 (1834); Feb. 28, 1859, Priv. L. No.
23-66, § 8, 4 Stat. (1834); An Act Making Appropriations for the Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department, and for Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian Tribes, for the Year
Ending June Thirtieth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty, Pub. L. No. 35-29, 11 Stat. 388, 401 (1859)); see
also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 262 (1901).
110. See Act March 3 (1891), Priv. L. No. 51-538, § 5, 26 Stat. 851 (1891).
111. See The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 249 (1873).
112. Id. at 253.
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This understanding of indigenous peoples as “nations” within the
scope of the “law of nations” is not confined to the past.  As recently as
2001, in considering the constitutionality of military tribunals for terrorists,
the Department of Justice relied on the precedent that Tribal Nations are
“domestic dependent nations” subject to the laws of war and adjudication of
hostilities by military tribunals.113  As recently as this term, the Supreme
Court found that the State of Washington’s fuel tax is pre-empted by a
treaty reservation of rights to the “Yakama Nation.”114
The Framers of the Constitution considered the indigenous peoples of
the United States to belong to “nations,” and that the principles of the law
of nations applied to their intergovernmental relations. We turn next to a
brief review of these principles, and how tribal nations, though sovereign,
were considered subject to the overriding authority of the United States.
IV. OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS AND TRIBAL
NATIONHOOD IN THE UNITED STATES
What is the law of nations? When considering the Framer’s intentions,
reference is often made to Emer de Vattel’s seminal work The Law of Na-
tions first published in 1758, which set out the “natural laws” governing the
rights and obligations involving intercourse between sovereigns, including
navigation, trade, war, diplomacy, and citizenship.115 Vattel’s text is said to
be “unrivaled among such treatises in its influence on the American Foun-
ders.”116
In 1775, Charles F. W. Dumas sent three copies of The Law of Nations
to Benjamin Franklin. Franklin’s letter to Dumas acknowledging receipt of
those copies reads as follows:
Philadelphia, December 19, 1775
Dear Sir:
I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of your edi-
tion of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a
rising State make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations. Ac-
cordingly, that copy which I kept (after depositing one in our own public
library here, and sending the other to the College of Massachusetts Bay, as
you directed) has been continually in the hands of the members of our Con-
113. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C. 238, 265–66
(Nov. 6, 2001) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
114. Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., No. 16-1498, 2019 WL 1245535
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2019).
115. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO
THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN
AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY (Richard Whatmore et al. eds., 1797) [hereinafter
VATTEL 1797] available at https://perma.cc/2UHQ-CMPA.
116. PETER AND NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD, THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN
AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776–1814 11 (1993).
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON107.txt unknown Seq: 17 15-MAY-19 9:26
2019 THE LAW OF NATIONS 57
gress now sitting, who are much pleased with your notes and preface, and
have entertained a high and just esteem for their author . . . .117
At the outset, Vattel’s The Law of Nations sets forth a broad definition
of “nation” that encompasses the indigenous tribal nations in North
America. “Nations or states are bodies politic, societies of men united to-
gether for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by
the joint efforts of their combined strength.”118 Vattel also set out the con-
cept used for the federal organization of the United States government:
[S]everal sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together
by a perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a per-
fect state. They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliber-
ations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in
certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of volun-
tary engagements.119
Vattel’s most significant influence on the early American relationship
with the indigenous inhabitants may have been his views on the obligation
of nations to engage in agriculture and cultivate the soil. Vattel believed
that the densely populated nations with too little land had a natural right to
take possession of lands that were used for hunting and subsistence, thus
“the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America
might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely law-
ful. The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhab-
ited them.”120 From this, the Framers developed their view that because the
native populations were not engaged in intensive agriculture in the same
manner as European settlers, they did not fully own the land but held only a
right of occupancy while the United States held the right of preemption won
from Great Britain in 1783. Thomas Jefferson, as the first Secretary of
State, declared, “What did I understand to be our rights in the Indian soil? 1.
A right of preemption in their lands; that is to say the sole and exclusive
right of purchasing from them whenever they should be willing to sell.”121
Vattel’s work also influenced the Framers and the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the relationship between the United States and tribal na-
tions, where tribal nations retain their inherent sovereignty within the
framework of a trust relationship. Vattel wrote extensively of the rights and
obligations of nations in trust relationships or “unequal alliance.”122
117. 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 64 (1889).
118. VATTEL 1884, supra note 94, at § 1. R
119. VATTEL 1797, supra note 115, at § 10. R
120. Id. at § 81 (“The cultivation of the soil, a natural obligation . . .”).
121. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 197 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892); 1 JUNE TO 31
DECEMBER 1792 30 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990) (Thomas Jefferson, Notes of a Conversation with Mr.
Hammond, June 3, 1792).
122. See VATTEL 1884, supra note 94, at 200–04. R
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We ought, therefore, to account as sovereign states those which have united
themselves to another more powerful, by an unequal alliance . . . . The
conditions of those unequal alliances may be infinitely varied. But whatever
they are, provided the inferior ally reserve to itself the sovereignty, or the
right of governing its own body, it ought to be considered as an independent
state, that keeps up an intercourse with others under the authority of the law
of nations.123
In 1832, the Supreme Court applied this understanding of the law of nations
as the basis for recognizing inherent tribal sovereignty. In Worcester v.
Georgia,124 Chief Justice Marshall cited Vattel in reasoning that the power
of tribal governments to make treaties was premised on the power of self-
government. “The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means
‘a people distinct from others.’”125 His opinion explained:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence—its right to self-government, by associating with a stronger,
and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without strip-
ping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of
this kind are not wanting in Europe, “Tributary and feudatory states,” says
Vattel, “do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long
as self-government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state.”126
In his seminal legal opinion The Powers of Indian Tribes, Felix Cohen
relied on the same passages from Vattel and Worcester as the authority for
his argument that tribal nations exercise inherent sovereignty; they “exer-
cise powers of self-government, not by virtue of any delegation of powers
from the Federal Government, but rather by reason of their original tribal
sovereignty.”127 The law of nations and the Offences Clause lie at the heart
of the federal Indian law principle that tribal nations possess inherent sover-
eignty, limited only by treaty and trust relationships with the United
States.128
Vattel’s The Law of Nations had a profound influence on the Framers,
and this included their conception of the legal relationship between the
United States and tribal nations. Because of this, the Constitution was
drafted specifically to grant Congress the authority to define the law of
nations between sovereigns, including tribal nations.
123. Id. § 5.
124. 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
125. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
126. Id. at 560–61 (emphasis added).
127. 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN
AFFAIRS 1917–1974 448 (1979).
128. Dossett, supra note 37, at 260 (explaining the origin of the federal trust responsibility). R
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V. SCOPE OF THE OFFENCES CLAUSE INCLUDES CIVIL REMEDIES
AS WELL AS CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
The Framers intended the term “offence” in its broad sense, to include
not only criminal offences, but any transgression or injury that could lead to
conflict between nations. The purpose of the clause was to shift control over
international relationships from the states to the new federal government
and for the United States to avoid military reprisals for the misconduct of its
citizens.129 In this nation-to-nation context, sanctions for “offences” more
frequently involve reparation of damages rather than criminal penalties, be-
cause nations are capable of war and peace, paying damages, and transfer-
ring custody of persons or property, but cannot be placed in prison or pun-
ished in a corporal sense.
This broad understanding of the term “offence” is supported by dic-
tionaries available at the time, 130 as well Vattel’s treatment of the word. He
stressed that offences are committed by one nation against another and can
include a broad range of insults and injuries: “Nothing is more opposite to
the duties of humanity, nor more contrary to that society which should be
cultivated by nations, than offences, or actions which give a just displeasure
to others: every nation therefore should carefully avoid giving any other
nation real offence.”131 Vattel emphasized the importance of civil remedies
for offences against the law of nations: “But if there is question of obtaining
reparation of the damage done, together with adequate satisfaction for the
offence, we must apply to the sovereign of the delinquents; we must not
pursue them into his dominions, or have recourse to arms, unless he has
refused to do us justice.”132 Blackstone also included within the law of na-
tions “civil transactions and questions of property between the subjects of
different states.”133
The full text of the Offences Clause is “to define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations.”134 During the Convention, the terms “define” and “punish” were
subject to substantive debate by the Committee of Detail. Gouverneur Mor-
ris moved to strike the word “punish” as it stood alone before the phrase
“the law of nations,” so that the law would “be definable as well as punisha-
ble . . .”135 When James Wilson argued that the United States could not
129. See infra note 130. R
130.  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1395 (1755).
131. VATTEL 1797, supra note 115, § 19. R
132. Id. § 43.
133. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (U.K., Clarendon
Press 1769).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
135. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 316 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
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“pretend to define” the law of nations, Morris replied: “The word define is
proper when applied to offenses in this case; the law of nations being often
too vague and deficient to be a rule.”136 The change was accepted by a vote,
and the clause adopted as it now stands.137 This discussion indicates that the
“Law of Nations” refers to a body of principles, not set in stone, and it is for
Congress to define these principles by providing specific laws that will be
enforced within the United States. In this way, Morris, an ally of George
Washington and other Federalists who favored a strong central government,
secured broad federal authority to regulate international affairs.
A question may arise from the text “define and punish.” May Congress
simply define the law of nations in a civil context without also imposing
criminal punishment? Yes, the power to “define and punish” offences
against the law of nations is the power to both define offences and to punish
offences. The construction does not limit Congress to only criminal punish-
ment, but is open-ended to permit Congress to define offences that have
only a civil remedy. Many clauses in the constitution are constructed the
same way, as inclusive lists of related powers or rights. For example, the
power to “raise and support” armies permits Congress to take separate ac-
tions to both raise armies and support armies. The power to provide for
“organizing, arming, and disciplining” the militia is a list of three separate
but related powers. The Second Amendment protects the right of the people
“to keep and bear Arms” which is the right to both keep arms and bear
arms, and does not imply that the people must always bear the arms they
keep. In the same way, the powers to “define and punish” offenses are two
separate powers related to the law of nations.
The most powerful affirmation of the civil purpose of the Offences
Clause comes from Congress itself. The First Congress enacted the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in 1789, granting federal courts “original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”138 In 2004, the Supreme
Court affirmed the civil purpose of ATCA, which should be “read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability at the time.”139 In two more recent statutes,
Congress has cited the Offences Clause in support of the power to regulate
civil liability: the authority to determine when foreign sovereigns can be
136. Id. at 614–15.
137. Id. at 615.
138. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 76–77; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350. ATCA
has been subject to increased attention in the federal courts in recent years as foreign citizens seek
remedies for human rights violations. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014).
139. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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sued in United States courts,140 and the power to create civil liability for
certain international human rights violations.141 As discussed below, con-
gressional enactment of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
can be traced to no other source of enumerated authority other than the
Offences Clause.142
Professor Beth Stephens has reviewed the historical development of
the Offences Clause in detail and concluded that its original purpose was to
empower Congress to enact a broad range of legislation including civil and
criminal matters arising between nations.143 In 1781, a resolution of the
Continental Congress detailed the States’ failure to address “Offences
against the Law of Nations”144 and recommended that state legislatures
“authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured, and for
compensation to the United States for damage sustained by them from an
injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.”145 Only Connecticut re-
sponded, and in 1785 the Continental Congress again recommended that the
states provide penalties for violations of the law of nations.146 The genesis
of the Offences Clause was this effort to provide civil remedies for offences
against the law of nations. As discussed above, concerns over treaty viola-
tions and violations of the law of nations were a moving force behind the
Constitutional Convention; and state conflict with tribal nations was a chief
example of these concerns.
There is general agreement among Congress, the Supreme Court, and
legal scholars that the scope of the Offences Clause includes both civil and
criminal sanctions.147 We turn next to how this enumerated power is a
140. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610–11
(listing the Offences Clause as basis of congressional authority to enact the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act); S. REP. NO. 94-1310, at 12 (1976) (same).
141. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5–6 (1991) (listing the Offences Clause as the basis of Congress’s
power to enact the Torture Victim Protection Act).
142. See infra note 160 (discussing constitutional authority in Offences Clause); see also infra Part R
VI (discussing federal law on international child custody and citizenship).
143. Stephens, supra note 7, at 461–462, 469. R
144. Report to Congress, Edmund Randolph et al. (1781), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITU-
TION 66 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
145. Id.
146. See 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 654-55 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1933).
147. Stephens, supra note 7, at 454 (“A close examination of the text of the Offenses Clause, the R
historical context in which it was drafted, and the constitutional structure of which it is a key part,
demonstrates that the Clause was not—and should not be—limited to criminal prosecutions.”); Morley,
supra note 7, at, 111 n.18 (2002) (“I agree with Professor Stephens that the Clause permits both civil R
and criminal sanctions.”); Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitu-
tion’s Law of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1675, 1742 (2015) (“To be sure, the ATS is not a
criminal statute. The Offenses Clause’s punishing power encompasses civil liability.”). To the extent
there is scholarly disagreement, the debate is whether Congress can use the clause to incorporate interna-
tional agreements that address purely domestic matters into federal law, or is limited to governing actual
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source of authority for defining the citizenship of children, and the Indian
Child Welfare Act.
VI. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AS AN EXPRESSION OF
CONGRESS’S POWER TO DEFINE OFFENCES AGAINST
THE LAW OF NATIONS
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to keep native families in-
tact because families are as essential to tribal nations’ continued existence
as they are to any society. ICWA was the product of rising concern in the
mid-1970s over the consequences to American Indian and Alaska Native
children, families, and tribes of abusive child-welfare practices. These prac-
tices resulted in the separation of large numbers of children from their fami-
lies and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-
Indian homes.148 Congress heard evidence that “25–35% of American In-
dian and Alaska Native children had been separated from their families and
placed in foster homes, adoptive homes or institutions.”149 Congress specif-
ically found that “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . .”150 This con-
cern was also expressly reflected in the floor statements of the principal
sponsor in the House, Representative Morris Udall, who stated that “Indian
tribes and Indian people are being drained of their children and, as a result,
their future as a tribe and a people is being placed in jeopardy.”151 As the
National Indian Tribal Chairman’s Association testified during the 1978
hearing:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our
children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are
to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their
people. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes’ ability to
continue as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more im-
portant that tribal sovereignty be respected that in an area as socially and
culturally determinative as family relationships.152
The primary mechanism used by Congress to address this crisis was to
“curtail state authority” and to strengthen tribal authority over child welfare
interactions with citizens of other nations. The application of the Offences Clause to tribal nations is
unaffected by this debate because tribal citizens were, and are, understood to be citizens of other nations.
148. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
149. Id. at 55 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2018).
151. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34 n.3 (citations omitted) (describing statements made on the house
floor).
152. To Establish Standards for the Placement of Indian Children in Foster or Adoptive Homes, to
Prevent the Breakup of Indian Families, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2 (1978), 193 (1981).
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matters.153 ICWA “is based upon the fundamental assumption that it is in
the child’s best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected . . . ”154
The Act establishes exclusive tribal jurisdiction over reservation-domiciled
Indian children,155 provides for the transfer of off-reservation state court
proceedings to tribal court,156 recognizes the right of American Indian and
Alaska Native tribes to intervene in state court,157 and recognizes, as a mat-
ter of federal law, tribally-established placement preferences for state place-
ments of American Indian and Alaska Native children.158 ICWA includes a
number of other provisions designed to keep families together or ensure
placement with extended family or tribal members.159 Together, these pro-
visions serve to protect the relationship between tribal nations and the chil-
dren and families that are their foundation.
Despite the fundamental importance of this law to the future of tribal
nations, ICWA faces significant challenges to its constitutionality as dis-
cussed above. Because ICWA is critical to native children, their families,
and the continued existence of tribal nations, it is important to consider
additional sources of enumerated authority in the Constitution.
The Offences Clause provides ample constitutional authority. Vattel
recognized the citizenship and custody of children as a subject of the law of
nations:
As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the chil-
dren of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their
fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this,
in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed,
as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his
children the right of becoming members of it.160
The purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act fits closely with Vattel’s natu-
ral law theory. In its findings, the Act states “that there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in pro-
tecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe.” 161 The Framers would have understood the widespread
confiscation of native children from their families by state governments as
153. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45 n.17.
154. Id. at 37, 50 n.24 (citations omitted).
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2018).
156. Id. § 1911(b).
157. Id. § 1911(c).
158. Id. § 1915(c).
159. Id. §§ 1901–1963.
160. VATTEL 1844, supra note 94, at 100–02 (“By the law of nature alone, children follow the R
condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights; the place of birth produces no change in this
particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him.”).
161. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2018).
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an offence against the law of nations, and that ICWA, or any law regulating
the citizenship and custody of children between sovereign nations, was
within the scope of federal authority under the Offences Clause. Indeed,
these laws are common in federal law and throughout the world.
VII. COMPARISON TO FEDERAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
CHILD CUSTODY AND CITIZENSHIP
Understanding ICWA as an expression of congressional power over
citizenship and the law of nations addresses the State of Texas’s claim
(which was adopted by the district court in Brackeen) that “deferring to
tribal membership eligibility standards based on ancestry, rather than actual
tribal affiliation, the ICWA’s jurisdictional definition of ‘Indian children’
uses ancestry as a proxy for race and therefore ‘must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”162 ICWA’s use of ancestry is com-
parable to federal laws regulating the citizenship of children in the interna-
tional context. If ICWA’s use of ancestry is unlawful, so is much of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act relating to the children of U.S. citizens
born abroad. Foreign-born children are analogous to tribal citizens born
outside of tribal jurisdiction in that they frequently do not become citizens
automatically upon birth but must demonstrate ancestry or parentage.
First, it is worth noting that the federal law regarding nationality at
birth contains a special provision to include “a person born in the United
States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal
tribe.”163 This reflects the Snyder Act of 1924, which admitted all tribal
citizens born in the U.S. to full U.S. citizenship.164 The Texas argument that
tribal ancestry is an unlawful racial classification may prove too much, in
that the U.S. citizenship of over four million Native Americans is based on
a similar ancestral classification.
Second, the more general provisions for foreign-born children of U.S.
citizens are filled with ancestral qualifications with unique provisions when
both parents are citizens of the United States and when only one parent is a
U.S. citizen.165 The law relating to children born out of wedlock requires “a
blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear
162. Brackeen, 2018 WL 4927908, at *26 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995)).
163. 8 U.S.C. §1401(b) (2018).
164. An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Issue Certificates of Citizenship to Indians,
Pub. L. No. 68-233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018).
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and convincing evidence.”166 The use of ancestry to determine citizenship
is long-established in federal law.
More generally, the use of ancestry to determine citizenship is a well-
recognized principle of international law. Although every nation has its own
laws regarding citizenship, there are two main categories. In the first one,
“jus sanguinis,” or the principle of blood, descent and heritage play a piv-
otal role in defining who can become a citizen.167 The second, “jus soli,”
defines citizens as those born within the country, regardless of the citizen-
ship of the parents.168 Federal law in the United States incorporates both
principles, and the use of ancestral classifications in ICWA should be given
similar deference.169
The federal immigration and nationality laws reflect Congress’s power
under Article I, Section 8, clause 4 (also referred to as the Nationality
Clause), which reads: Congress shall have Power “To establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization.” But the same cannot be said of the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction170 and its federal
implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA).171 The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty that provides a
set of principles for the return of children abducted from one country to
another.172 ICARA is the federal law that implements the Hague Conven-
tion in the United States, and requires both state and federal courts to hear
petitions for return of a child to their habitual country of residence. Because
the Hague Convention and ICARA are unrelated to naturalization laws,
they are a clearer example of congressional authority to define the law of
nations regarding the custody of children, and to impose that law in state
courts.
The 1980 Hague Convention’s stated goals are straightforward: “to se-
cure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any
Contracting State, and to ensure that the rights of custody and access under
the laws of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Con-
tracting States.”173 The Convention does not seek to determine the merits of
custody issues or determine citizenship, only to reestablish the status quo
166. Id. § 1409. Note that the Supreme Court has addressed the gender inequality aspects of this law
in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
167. Jus sanguinis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
168. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construc-
tion of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2152–53 (2014).
169. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2018).
170. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
171. 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2018).
172. Id. § 9001(4).
173. Hague Convention, supra note 170, at art. 1. R
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and return jurisdiction to the country of habitual residence where the merits
of the custody dispute can be resolved. In this manner, ICARA—like
ICWA—removes traditional state authority over child custody in certain
cases, and subjects state courts to federal law. The Hague Convention is the
“law of nations,” a body of principles established by international agree-
ment. With ICARA, Congress defined these principles by providing spe-
cific laws that will be enforced within the United States. In this way, both
ICWA and ICARA are examples of Congress using its Offences Clause
power to define the law of nations applicable to state court child custody
proceedings.
Foreign affairs are like federal Indian law in that the Supreme Court
has often asserted the federal government has inherent “plenary” power.174
As reliance on unenumerated authority has fallen into disfavor, the original
purpose of the Offences Clause for regulating matters relating to both for-
eign nations and tribal nations deserves greater attention. The parallels in
matters of child custody and citizenship demonstrate this connection be-
tween the fields of foreign affairs and Indian affairs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution originated in significant part because
the Articles of Confederation created competition and conflict between the
states over both foreign affairs and Indian affairs. The Framers, as part of a
comprehensive displacement of state sovereignty over foreign and tribal re-
lations, stripped away the states’ powers to conclude treaties and to regulate
foreign and Indian commerce and vested those powers in Congress and the
President. The Offences Clause also was intended by the Framers to author-
ize Congress alone to define and punish offenses against the law of nations,
a source of authority for regulating the intercourse between sovereign na-
tions, including tribal nations. The Framers relied heavily on the work of
Emer de Vattel, who recognized the citizenship and custody of children as a
proper subject of the law of nations. The Indian Child Welfare Act secures
the rights of native families to protect the custody of their children and the
rights of tribal nations to preserve their societies. With its firm anchor in
Vattel’s conceptual work, the Offences Clause offers a textual source of
authority for the Indian Child Welfare Act as well as other relationships
among sovereigns, including tribal nations.
174. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1936); Sarah H. Cleve-
land, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins
of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2002).
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